Shoppers for the long haul : the past, present and future of consumption by Betty Joyce Nash
F
amily Dollar Stores Inc. has changed its product 
mix to reflect preferences for consumables such 
as canned food or bread or paper towels. The 
efforts of the Mathews, N.C-based retailer have paid off.
December sales grew 4 percent above the same month in
2008, even in stores open for at least a year. They’re now
attracting higher-income shoppers they hope will return
even when consumers start spending more freely.
In this recession, people have cut back on purchases of
everything from new clothes to homes to refrigerators. In
2009, overall personal spending declined, particularly on
vehicles and other household durable goods. Spending on
services was more stable, but people ate out less and cut
back on vacations, even though disposable income rose by
1.1 percent, largely because of tax cuts and rebates. 
In contrast, savings rates for the year reached 4.3 percent,
up from 2.6 in 2008. This makes economic sense after a
shock. People will “rein in their spending aggressively in
order to increase their buffer stock of savings,” says Satyajit
Chatterjee, an economist at the Philadelphia Fed.
Consumer activity still represents the biggest chunk of
the nation’s output, as it does in most countries. But today
people are spending less for many reasons. Perceptions
about future wealth are one of the biggest influences on
spending. 
Income and Consumption
How people view future income growth potential affects
spending patterns. But for decades economists took a view
of consumption that didn’t account for these expectations.   
John Maynard Keynes introduced the first “consumption
function” in 1936 to chart the relationship between annual
disposable income and consumer spending. His “absolute
income hypothesis” suggested that consumption depends
on current income only. Available household data at the time
seemed to bear this out: Higher-earning households tended
to spend more than poorer households although the portion
of wealthier households’ income consumed was smaller. 
The real test of this theory would be whether it held for
aggregate consumer spending and aggregate income at dif-
ferent points in time. In Keynes’ day, data on aggregate
spending and income for different years weren’t available,
explains Chatterjee. The spending-income relationship has
since been studied as scholars have developed better
datasets and statistical techniques. Two newer theories add
important insights.
Both theories are based on assumptions of “rational
choice.”  Both estimate how a household will act over time
in the face of uncertainty about future income. Nobel Prize-
winning economist Franco Modigliani explained that people
spend and save according to expected lifetime income, not
current income. “In a rational choice context, current
spending need not respond to a change in current income if
that change is fully anticipated in a previous period,”
Chatterjee writes of Modigliani’s research with his student
Richard Brumberg. An implication of the model is that eco-
nomic growth increases average lifetime incomes over time
and this causes people to assume that over time they will get
richer. This suggests that aggregate spending will grow pro-
portionally. 
Yet Milton Friedman may have been most responsible for
showing how the relationship between consumption and
income would be borne out in real life. In his 1957 book, 
A Theory of the Consumption Function, he developed the 
“permanent income hypothesis.” People are more likely to
consume more when permanent income — expected life-
time income — rises. He argued that if income jumps and
there’s a reason to believe it’s temporary, people may 
consume more but not as much as if they had received a 
permanent raise. Asimilar relationship can be inferred from
a drop in income: Becoming temporarily poorer may not
inhibit consumption in the short-term as much as an 
expected long-term decline might.  
In each of these theories, the relevant comparison is
between consumption and expectations of lifetime income
or total wealth. Empirical tests of these theories have 
yielded mixed results. But the element that survives in most
studies is the underlying approach that recognizes house-
hold response to expectations about the future. 
In the 1990s, work by economists Christopher Carroll of
Johns Hopkins University and Angus Deaton of Princeton
University has added the idea of “precautionary savings”
into models. Simulations reveal that people often accumu-
late a buffer stock of savings to protect their households
from unforeseen circumstances.
These theories may explain why people who make more
money are shopping at discount stores such as Family Dollar,
and also may explain rising savings rates in the first half of
2009. Expectations about the future would have to be a part
of any explanation for this renewed savings behavior. Theory
helps explain consumer response in the current economic
climate but can’t forecast when people will start spending.
That will occur as people pay down debt, accumulate rainy
day funds, and regain confidence about future income. 
The Contours of Consumer Spending
Decreases in consumer spending like this haven’t been seen
since the recession of the early 1980s. This time around, the
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 credit market conditions and the growing home equity that
softened the 2001 recession are missing. 
As people consumed consistent with anticipated wealth
based on rising house prices, they helped fuel economic
expansion until house prices fell and triggered the financial
crisis. Then spending slowed and so did growth in the
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). These personal con-
sumption expenditures (PCE) dominate GDP and are said
to drive the economy. 
Consumers’ share of GDP has grown over time. In 1951,
PCE was 61.5 percent of GDP, where it stayed for three
decades until it rose to 63 percent in 1980. By 2008, it com-
prised 70.1 percent. Today, spending on services ($6.8 trillion)
is almost twice as large as spending on goods ($3.3 trillion). 
In 1950, services represented about 40 percent of spending,
but today it hovers around 70 percent (see figure above).
Since that time, real incomes have grown, along with
household wealth. From 1959 to 2000, real per-capita dispos-
able personal income grew at an average annual rate of 2.3
percent.  More women entered into the work force, which
encouraged even more services purchases — think day care
and eating out. During that time, there was also the addition
of government payments for health care via Medicare and
Medicaid. As workers matured, they also earned more to pay
for such services. Increasing household wealth through
homeownership and individual stock purchases also fueled
discretionary spending on vacations, vehicles, and electron-
ics. Technological change also expanded the field of
consumer options for both goods and services.
Growth in services has partly come from sectors that
have seen rapid technological innovation such as communi-
cations. In 1995 purchases of communications services
accounted for $89.3 billion (in 2005 dollars), or about 1.5 per-
cent of PCE that year. In just 14 years, the category has
grown to 2.4 percent of PCE, and more than doubled in real
terms ($231 billion). 
Meanwhile, people spent less of their overall budget on
nondurable goods such as food to prepare at home, and less
on durable goods like automobiles and furniture. The
decline in clothing expenditures partly reflected falling 
relative prices.
By far the biggest services category is health care — $1.4
trillion, or more than 15 percent of PCE in 2009. That’s
roughly the same share of PCE as it was in 1995, but more
than five times what it was in 1950. That includes doctor
and dental services as well as home health care and expendi-
tures on medical labs. 
The durable goods category is often considered a barom-
eter of economic activity because it includes items such as
appliances, cars, and electronics — goods that wear out 
over time. Purchases of durable goods tend to rise with 
economic expansions and fall in economic contractions. 
In fact, the variance in durable goods purchases is much 
higher than that of personal consumption expenditures
generally. For example, spending on household durables
went from $820 million in 2000 to almost $1.2 billion in
2007 in real terms, which reflects the run-up in housing,
before declining in 2008 and 2009. During the recession of
1960, durable goods purchases fell by 12 percent. In the 1980
recession, they fell by 13.4 percent, and by 10 percent in 1990
through the first quarter of 1991 (see figure on page 19). 
How Personal Are Consumption Expenditures?
Spending money on cell phones, on eating out, or on refrig-
erators is fairly easy to understand, but other elements of the
PCE are less transparent. The PCE tracks money house-
holds pay for products such as carpets, tools and computers,
cereal and meats, jewelry and therapeutic appliances to serv-
ices such as health care and dry cleaners. The category also
includes money consumers don’t spend except indirectly
through taxes.  
Health care goods and services, for instance, includes
government payments to physicians and hospitals. The total
health care category represents about 15 percent of GDP. Yet
about only 15 percent of that health care spending is out of
pocket, according to economist Michael Mandel, formerly
of Business Week. The remainder comes from government or
employee health plans. 
There’s also the amount of “imputed rental value” for hous-
ing. The government assumes an imputed rent on housing
even if a house is paid off. This figure is included to help cap-
ture in the PCE data the amount of money spent on shelter. 
Then there’s an amount imputed for financial services
such as interest-free checking accounts. But that’s not really
an explicit cost but rather an opportunity cost because the
bank doesn’t pay interest but uses the money. Had customers
invested savings elsewhere, they might have earned a return
on the money. Other items, like the net income of nonprof-
its, are also not strictly consumer-driven but are included as
consumption expenditures in the national accounts. 
Another 12 percent of GDP is represented by imports
such as computers and televisions. These are goods manu-
factured elsewhere and the only contribution to U.S. GDPis
perhaps through the money spent to transport or sell those
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 goods. Taking that into account changes the math. Mandel
suggests that domestically produced goods and services
drive less economic activity than is often commonly cited.
Household Behavior
Overall spending barely dipped in the 2001 recession, as
people were able to consume via credit card borrowing or
home equity loans. “Interest rates were low and people were
able to take advantage of that and borrow more; there was a
lot of cash-out refinancing that made for a mild recession” 
in 2001, says Karen Dynan, currently of the Brookings
Institution and formerly an economist at the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors.
In the past two decades, credit innovation and increasing
incomes allowed people to align spending with long-term
income prospects. Wide participation in equity markets and
increasing home prices added to household wealth.
Aggregate household wealth stayed at about four times
aggregate personal income from 1960 through the mid-
1990s. It then grew to 5.25 and 5.5 times personal income in
1999 and 2006, respectively, according to Dynan in a 2009
paper published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Meanwhile, the debt-to-income ratio has grown.
Households as a group came into this recession more highly
indebted than in other recent recessions, Chatterjee
explains. And that’s worked against spending. Credit card
firms have responded to the downturn “by slashing credit
limits and raising interest rates because the loans look more
risky to them now.” And that led to curtailed spending as
households aggressively paid down debt, another way of
increasing savings. Consumers are also saving another way:
cash-in refinancing. That’s when people put more money on
the mortgage to reduce payments. The government housing
corporation, Freddie Mac, reported that in the final quarter
of 2009, cash-in financing grew to a third of all refinancings. 
Spending will certainly return, but how quickly? The
drop in consumer spending in the early 1980s was followed
by a spending spree. “After recession ended in 1982, we saw a
real snapback in consumption — 5 percent or 6 percent
growth in the first year. That is unlikely to happen in this
episode,” Dynan says. The unemployment rate in that reces-
sion reached the same level as that of the current downturn,
but the damage to household balance sheets will linger.
While consumers “have recovered some, on net they are still
down by a substantial amount, about 20 percent, and they
lost tremendous wealth through their homes.” 
Savings rates, however, are going up.  Between 1959 and
1990, savings averaged almost 9 percent, but the rate went
negative in the third quarter of 2005. Soon after, in the 
second quarter of 2006, household borrowing peaked at
nearly $1.4 trillion before falling to a negative $279 billion by
third quarter 2008. Households are now de-leveraging by
paying down (or defaulting) on their debt, according to a
2009 paper by economist Riccardo DiCecio and research
associate Charles Gascon of the St. Louis Fed. Savings rates
have climbed since 2008. 
That has an upside since long-term economic growth
stems from innovation and capital investment. By examining
savings rates relative to GDPgrowth since 1948, St. Louis Fed
economist Daniel Thornton found that the savings rate grew
from 6 percent in the late 1940s to 12.5 percent in second
quarter of 1975, and fell to 1.2 percent by fourth quarter 2007.
“Over these same periods, output grew at rates of 3.8 percent,
3.2 percent, and minus 2.4 percent respectively.” Personal 
savings and growth may correlate, and a higher savings rate
may not hinder an economic expansion, although these
results are not conclusive. More savings, besides buffering
economic shocks to households, could flow to increased cap-
ital investment. Mainly, these results serve to underscore that
the relationship between household savings and broader
macroeconomic growth is more complicated. 
As households rebuild wealth and feel secure about
employment, spending will likely resume. But will the
decline in current wealth be seen by households as a perma-
nent change or a temporary one? Stores like Family Dollar
aren’t waiting for an academic consensus on that. They are
planning future product mixes on the assumption that they
will keep their new customers in the future — the ones who
traded down when the purse strings tightened. RF
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